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This study aims at evaluating the relation between South-South
trade agreements, location of production and inequality in Latin Amer-
ican RTAs. Following Sanguinetti et al.(2004) and Midelfart-Knarvik
et al.(2000), an empirical model will be estimated to check whether
industry localization was a®ected by the agreement. An ending sec-
tion will then evaluate the overall impact of trade agreements on ¾
-convergence, i.e. the standard deviation of income levels of countries
belonging to the same agreement.
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JEL Class.:F02,F15,O14,O54,C33 1 Introduction and Literature Review
Aim of this paper is to evaluate the relation between South-South trade
agreements, industrial location and inequality in Latin America.
Location of production is determined by country speci¯c features, such as
factor endowments, policy framework, technological advance and the size of
the internal market. Though, having care only to country speci¯c charac-
teristics would not allow to explain why very similar countries often show
di®erent production structures: ceteris paribus, some countries show higher
shares of industrial production than others. This can be referred to the ex-
istence of industry speci¯c characteristics which, together with geography,
cause agglomeration forces to operate. In this sense, the presence of trade
or transport costs, economies of scale and backward and forward linkages,
ceteris paribus, can cause production to concentrate in a few locations and
only by time, when wages become unsustainable, let it spread to lower wage
economies. Thus, as Puga and Venables(1998) point out,\growth in world
manufacturing relative to other tradable industries does not lead to a steady
development of low wage economies, but instead to rapid industrialization of
countries in turn".
While Puga and Venables(1998) focus on the role of developing countries
unilateral trade policy for industrial development, Venables(2002) analyzes
the e®ect of the negotiation of a Customs Union(CU) on industrial develop-
ment both in symmetrical and asymmetrical agreements1. The idea is that
1Symmetrical and asymmetrical are referred to the level of development of countries
involved, thus a South-South CU would be a symmetrical agreement between developing
countries.
3the formation of a CU among countries with similar comparative advantage
would cause the latter to be altered, bene¯ting the country with an inter-
mediate comparative advantage with respect to the partners and the rest
of the world at the expenses of partners with an extreme comparative ad-
vantage: preferential tari®s would a®ect production location via their e®ect
on the structure of regional comparative advantages. The changing in re-
gional comparative advantage together with the above mentioned country
and industry characteristics then determine production patterns. Thus, ce-
teris paribus, countries with a higher share of skilled labor would see their
share of skilled labor intensive industries increase after the formation of the
CU. Now, from an empirical point of view it is important to highlight how
the regional integration process together with a pre-existing di®erent trade
specialization among partners can a®ect the location of production.
Some empirical papers address similar issues, Midelfart-Knarvik et al.(2000)
analyze the determinants of location of production across Europe. Their de-
pendent variable is the share of industry k production in country i relative
to the size of the industry k across Europe and country i's total production.
They test a series of country and industry determinants together with several
interactions between the former and the latter. They ¯nd that EU's cross
country variation in industrial structure can be explained by comparative ad-
vantage combined with transport costs and geography. Factor endowments,
skilled labor in particular, are important in attracting high skill intensive in-
dustry. Forward and backward linkages matter too. Finally the fall in trade
costs and government intervention makes economic forces become important
in determining location. More recently, Sanguinetti et al.(2004) focus on
4the relocation of industry following the formation of Mercosur. Using data
on Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay over the period 1985-1998 they ¯nd that
preferential trade liberalization has favored a reshaping of manufacturing
production according to regional comparative advantage in labor and skilled
labor and that declining internal tari®s have weakened agglomeration forces
determined by the distribution of the market sizes. Their dependent vari-
able is the country share production of industry k over the whole regional
manufacturing product. Apart from interacting country and industry charac-
teristics, the main contribution of this paper is the detection of the agreement
e®ect via the introduction of the preferential margin and its interactions with
country and industry speci¯c characteristics in the regression.
Within this frame, the main contribution of the present work is the focus
on the relation between regional partners' trade specialization patterns, lo-
calization of industry and inequality across Latin American sub-regions, i.e.
Mercosur, Andean Community and the Central American Common Market
before and after the negotiations of the early 90s.
The ¯rst part of the work will deal with the relation between trade agree-
ments formation, trade specialization and location of production on the basis
of industry level data: the role of trade integration will be controlled via the
introduction of three di®erent variables. Firstly, for each industry the re-
gional output growth is introduced: the idea is that if the preferential tari®
structure causes industry to relocate among countries within the same agree-
ment a signi¯cant relation needs to exist between regional output growth
in industry k and localization of industry k in country i and if localization
is enhanced a positive relation is expected. Secondly, the Balassa Revealed
5Comparative Advantage (RCA) index of trade specialization with respect
to the sub-region is calculated for each industry: if countries with a higher
comparative advantage are favored in the relocation of production following
the formation of the integrated area, then the higher trade specialization in
industry k the more industry k will be localized in country i. Finally, the
ratio between the RCA calculated for the whole region with respect to trade
with the rest of the world and each country regional RCA is introduced as a
regressor in the empirical model to test Venalbes's model prediction: if the
formation of the integrated area causes countries with an intermediate com-
parative advantage to do better then the less country i is specialized with
respect to partners in the region the less industry k will be localized in it.
The second part of the work, instead, is based on the detection of the im-
pact of trade agreements on overall inequality and uses aggregated country
data on real GDP per capita. Following Slaughter(1998) the ¾-convergence
of regional groups is tested via a di®-in-di® technique.
The work is organized as follows. The next section deals with the description
of changes in trade and production patterns, the following section presents
the empirical strategy: the following sub-sections will present the data, the
empirical models and results. Summary conclusions will end the work.
62 Trade and Production Patterns in Latin
American Sub-Regions
Figure 1 shows the increase in the relative importance of the intra-regional
market for South-American countries manufactures2 In general, after the 90s




















Source:ECLAC. Calculations by the author.
partners in the agreements become the most favorite destinations for man-
ufacturing exports. Table 1 shows a symmetric version of the re-orientation
index proposed by Yeats(1998), i.e. the ratio between the share of manufac-
turing exports directed to the partners over total exports to the sub-region
and the share of manufacturing exports going to the world over total ex-
ports to the world. The index ranges between -1 and 1, with 0 indicating
geographic neutrality. A strong re-orientation process towards partners in
the agreement emerges for Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay and Costa Rica.
Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil do not substantially change the direction
of their exports, while Bolivia and the remaining CACM countries seem to
re-direct their exports towards destinations outside the region. One might
conclude that the formation of the agreement did not bring about a great
2The de¯nition of manufacturing industry adopted here is the UNCTAD-World Bank.
7change for the bigger countries which already held a wide share of total re-
gional trade, as is the case for Colombia Venezuela and Brazil. For smaller
countries, in the Southern cone instead it represented the chance to exploit a
wider destination market, as it could be the case for Argentina, and Ecuador.
The remaining countries might have stayed neutral to the formation or re-
negotiation of the integrated area. This is the case of Central American
countries which already enjoyed a higher level of integration and actively
trade outside the region too.
For Mercosur and Andean countries many traditional production industries34
are re-directed to the sub-region. Ecuador is the country which re-directs
the largest number of industries towards the partners among which electric
machinery and transport equipments, while Bolivia is the country with the
smallest one.
For CACM countries in general the re-direction process involves more dy-
namic industries5 with El Salvador having the largest number of industries
re-oriented towards the sub-region.
Tables 2-4 show the absolute variation in the Her¯ndal index for the three
sub-regions before and after the 90s6. Only those industries where localiza-
tion of production increased were presented.
Table 5 instead shows for each country within each agreement the change in
3Tables on the evolution of the re-orientation index for those ISIC manufacturing indus-
tries which experienced a re-direction towards the sub-regional markets can be obtained
from the author upon request.
4e.g. food, beverages and textiles
5i.e. electric machineries, professional and transport equipment
6It is calculated as:HERFINDALrk =
P
i s2
ik whereHERFINDALrk is the Her¯ndal
index for industry k in region r and si is the production share of partner i over the whole
of regional production in industry k.
8Table 1: Re-orientation of manufacturing exports
country-year 1985 1990 1995 2001
bolivia 0.59 0.27 -0.32 -0.44
colombia 0.63 0.46 0.39 0.43
ecuador 0.70 0.47 0.74 0.62
venezuela 0.65 0.68 0.57 0.62
argentina 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.22
brazil 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.21
uruguay 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.10
costarica 0.17 0.22 0.47 0.50
el salvador 0.51 0.36 0.25 0.04
guatemala 0.50 0.24 0.06 -0.10
honduras 0.61 0.27 0.24 0.04




Industrial chem. -0.21 0.01
Miscellaneous petr.and coal prod. -0.07 0.08
Paper and prod. -0.14 0.01
Petroleum ref. -0.13 0.03
Pottery -0.15 0.11
Rubber prod. -0.21 0.08
Textiles -0.23 0.05
Transport equipm. -0.08 0.01
the degree of specialization with respect to the whole region7 and the growth
of the overall share of regional manufacturing production.
Gathering the evidence from the tables, in the 90s the degree of intro-
version increases for the Andean Community and Mercosur and to a lesser
extent for the Central American Common Market.
In the South American agreements bigger partners, which already held a rel-
evant role in regional trade °ows, do not change the direction of their exports
while the remaining partners do(apart from Bolivia in the Andean commu-
7This is a modi¯ed of the Hoover Balassa index which provides a country specialization




k where SIi is the specialization index for country i, xik is country i's
production share of industry k over country i's total manufacturing and xrk measures re-
gion r's production share of industry k over the whole regional manufacturing production.
k measures the total number of industries




Iron and Steel -0.09 0.16
Leather Prod. 0.02 0.04
Machinery, electric -0.04 0.06
Machinery,exc.electrical -0.02 0.00
Non-ferrous metals 0.34 0.09
Other chem. -0.05 0.01
Plastic prod. -0.09 0.05
Pottery 0.04 0.06
Printing and Publish. -0.07 0.02
Professional and Scient. eq. 0.00 0.31
Rubber prod. -0.03 0.33
Tobacco 0.01 0.48
Wearing app.,ex.footwear -0.10 0.11
Wood prod. -0.13 0.01




Leather Prod. 0.03 0.07
Machinery, electric 0.15 0.05
Miscellaneous petr.and coal prod. -0.49 0.91
Other chem. -0.06 0.07
Petroleum ref. 0.00 0.06
Plastic prod. 0.08 0.02
Pottery -0.08 0.02
Printing and Publish. 0.06 0.01
Professional and Scient. eq. -0.02 0.36
Rubber prod. 0.00 0.37
Transport equipm. -0.14 0.08
Table 5: Specialization Index
Spec. Index share of reg.prod.
cty-year 85-90 90-95 85-90 90-95
ARG 0.003 -0.008 0.12 0.01
BRA 0.005 -0.001 -0.13 -0.02
URY -0.011 0.011 0.01 0.00
cty-year 75-90 90-95 75-90 90-98
BOL -0.010 0.008 0.01 0.00
COL 0.003 -0.001 0.09 -0.04
ECU -0.012 0.024 0.02 0.04
VEN 0.007 0.006 -0.13 0.00
cty-year 71-91 91-95 71-90 91-95
CRI -0.001 -0.005 0.06 0.00
GTM -0.002 -0.001 0.03 0.03
HND -0.011 0.000 0.04 -0.02
SLV 0.023 -0.007 -0.13 -0.02
10nity). In general all the exports re-directed to the region belong to industries
where countries gain ground in regional production and this especially is true
for Uruguay within Mercosur and for Ecuador which gains several industry
shares in the 90s and sells these productions to partners in the region.
For Central American countries instead, manufacturing exports are mainly
re-directed outside the region and, di®erently from South American coun-
tries, the region becomes the favorite destination for exports of machineries,
transport and professional equipments. There is almost a perfect matching
between re-oriented exports and gained industries in regional production.
Localization of production increases in several industries and main contrib-
utors to this patterns are Costa Rica and Guatemala.
In general, then, despite localization increases in several industries in the
all this pattern is due to di®erent countries gaining ground in di®erent in-
dustries. In Mercosur regional production seems to be more spread across
partners, especially Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay loses some industries and
becomes more specialized, though it gains in those industries whose exports
are re-directed to the sub-region. In the Andean Community, location of pro-
duction might seem to be more dispersed after the 90s than in the previous
period with Ecuador gaining ground in several industries, though Venezuelan
production shares dramatically increase in several of the industries with in-
creased regional Her¯ndal index. In the Central American Common Market
regional production in the 90s is shared especially by Costa Rica, Guatemala
and El Salvador, their degree of specialization with respect to the region de-
creases after the 90s showing a more diversi¯ed production structure. The
¯rst two countries gain more in regional shares than the latter. Honduras
11loses ground in regional production despite its degree of specialization does
not increase in the 90s.
3 The Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy is based on the estimation of two di®erent empir-
ical models. Firstly an empirical model based on industry level data will
be estimated in order to test the relation between economic integration and
localization of production within each agreement. Secondly, an empirical
model based on aggregated data on per capita income levels will be esti-
mated in order to detect via a di®erence-in-di®erences technique whether
the negotiation of the agreements brought about increased overall inequality.
3.1 The Empirical Model I
Following Midelfart-Knarvik et al.(2000) and Sanguinetti et al.(2004) the
empirical model in the basic speci¯cation is:









±jXitIkt + µi + ´k + ¿t + ²ikt (1)
here sikt =
qikt=Qkt
qit=Qt measures the share of country i's industry k in the to-
tal regional industry k production (qikt=Qkt with qikt measuring country i's
industry k production and Qkt measuring the regional production of k) nor-
malized by the country weight in total manufacturing in the region(qit=Qt
with qit measuring total country i's manufacturing production and Qt mea-
suring total regional manufacturing production), Xit and Ikt are respectively
12country i and industry k's characteristics a®ecting the location of k produc-
tion in i, the following term is the interaction between the previous ones, µi,
´k and ¿t represent country and industry speci¯c ¯xed e®ects and ¯nally ²ikt
is a time-varying shock. 8.
Model 1 is what in the empirical literature is known as a dynamic panel data
model: the lag of the dependent variable appears among the regressors cre-
ating a source of correlation between the lag of income and the error term.
In this frame the Arellano and Bond (1991)First Di®erence GMM estimator
(Blundell et al. (2000) and Bond et al. (2001)) estimator has been exten-
sively used for the estimation of growth regressions despite it performs very
poorly with a high persistence in the series9.
To overcome this problem the System-GMM might be of help (see Blundell
et. al. (2002)), though, can be considered as oversized with respect to the
available data set especially in the time span.
Nerlove(1992) highlights that the inconsistency of Within Group estimator
in dynamic panel data models fades away as far as the time dimension of the
data set gets longer. In the present case, though, Within Group estimator
might be severely biased since the time span is quite short, thus Kiviet cor-
rection (Kiviet(1995)) for Least Square Dummy Variables Estimator is used.
Finally, endogeneity of regressors is broken via the use of lagged values of
right hand side variables.
8It is worth to notice that the dependent variable can be interpreted both as a special-
ization and a localization measure.




Qkt=Qt so that it represents an index of country
i's production specialization in industry k and the localization of industry k in country i
relative to the localization of activity a a whole in i
9If this is the case, lagged values of the variables are very unlikely to serve as good
instruments for ¯rst di®erences
133.2 The Data
The data on manufacturing output is from UNIDO and ranges from 1970 to
2000, though observations not always are available for all countries, industries
and periods10.
Data on country speci¯c characteristics is from ECLAC and ranges from 1970
to 2000 and data on trade are from TradeCAN (ECLAC).
Finally, data on real GDP per capita from 1960 to 2000 is from PWT version
6.1.
For the estimation of model 1 variables a®ecting the location of production
are all taken in logs and in their lagged values and can be divided into four
main groups:
² country speci¯c factors: the share of agriculture over GDP, the popula-
tion education level(measured as the secondary school enrolment rate),
the size of the economy measured through GDP in order to detect a
country market potential and the total labor force are introduced
² industry speci¯c factors:labor intensity is detected by the number of
employees, skill intensity by the productivity level of employees, back-
ward and forward linkages are detected by total production in the rest
of manufacture. The idea is that if backward and forward linkages are
10For Mercosur data for Paraguay is never available and for CACM data on Nicaragua
only arrives to 1985 so these two countries were dropped from the analysis. For the
remaining countries data was available from 1970 to 1998, and to 2000 in some cases.
Though only those years were all, or almost all of the countries within an agreement were
present were used. For this for Mercosur data for years 1985, 1990 and 1993-1995 was used.
For the Andean Community data on output values is available for all of the countries from
1970 to 1998. Finally, for CACM data is available for all of the countries (i.e.four or three
over four countries)for the periods 1971-75, 1981-85 and 1991-95
14at work, the more the industrial structure widens and grows the more
industry k will enlarge within country i, thus a positive sign is expected.
Finally, scale economies are measured by means of a dummy variable
taking value 1 for those industries which are classi¯ed as scale economy
industries according to Pavitt classi¯cation.
² interactions: country speci¯c factors are interacted with industry spe-
ci¯c ones. Countries' labor force is interacted with labor intensity.
Countries'population education level is interacted with skill intensity
and market potential is interacted with the scale economy dummy.
² integration detectors: the increasing level of economic integration among
partners is detected by means of three variables.
Firstly, for each industry k in each country the growth rate of industry
k in the whole sub-region is introduced in order to check what relation
exists between the development of the industry in the whole region and
the same industry localization in country i.
Secondly, since the evolution of comparative advantages is believed to
a®ect production patterns among partner countries the Balassa Re-










xi measures country i industry k exports directed to the sub-
region over total country i exports to the partners and
xrk
xr measures
the sub-regional industry k exports over the total sub regional exports.
If trade integration causes comparative advantages to change then in-
15dustry k localization of production is believed to increase in locations
enjoying a higher specialization compared to partners.
Finally, always making use of the Balassa RCA index, a ratio was cal-
culated to check wether localization of production is more likely to
occur in countries with a comparative advantage which is intermediate
between the partners and the rest of the world. In order to achieve this








and noting that for countries which are relatively more specialized than
partners RCArk < RCAik and that the opposite holds for countries
with an extreme comparative advantage (disadvantage) then the ratio
r = RCArk=RCAik was calculated noting that for 0 < r < 1 countries
enjoy an intermediate comparative advantage and that for r > 1 in-
stead country show an extreme comparative disadvantage. Thus if the
formation of South-South RTAs brings about localization of production
in countries with an intermediate comparative advantage then the ratio
r is expected to show a negative sign thus predicting delocalization in
countries with high values of the ratio.
11Here xrk
xr again measures the sub-regional industry k exports over the total sub regional
exports and xwk
xw the world industry k exports over total world exports.
163.3 Results
Tables 10-14 in the appendix show results for the Andean Community and
the Central American Common Market12Each table respectively shows coef-
¯cients and P-values.
Table 10 shows results respectively when the regional industrial growth,
reg:sect:gr:, the regional RCA, reg:RCA, and the ratio between countries
and regional specialization indexes in industry k, r, are introduced in the
regression. From the cross e®ects in the ¯rst table, labor abundant locations
seem to attract labor intensive industries the same does not occur for skilled
labor abundant locations and skill intensive industries and for large market
potential countries and scale economy industries. The regional industrial
growth rate seem to positively a®ect the localization of production of indus-
try k in country i. The RCA index with respect to the sub-region shows
a positive sign suggesting that the higher country i trade specialization in
industry k the more industry k will become localized in country i. Finally
the coe±cient on the ratio r is signi¯cant and negatively related to local-
ization of production thus con¯rming that the more extreme is country i's
disadvantage with respect to partners in the agreement the less k production
will be localized in it.
Table 11 presents the estimation of model 1 when the sample is broken into
pre and post-agreement period. The cross e®ect of labor intensity and labor
force abundance is not signi¯cant anymore, while regional industrial growth
is always signi¯cant and higher in the post-agreement period. These ¯ndings
12For Mercosur the time span data was not enough to attempt an estimation of model
1.
17are con¯rmed in table 12, though in the post agreement period the regional
RCA does not turn out to be signi¯cant and the signi¯cance of the ratio r is
lower than in the ¯rst period and in table 10.
Table 13 shows results for CACM: again labor abundant locations attract
labor intensive industries, but the same does not occur for skilled labor abun-
dant locations and skill intensive industries and for large market potential
countries and scale economy industries. The coe±cient for the regional in-
dustrial growth is positive and signi¯cant, though when the regional RCA
and the ratio r are introduced it is not signi¯cant anymore, moreover these
two variables turn out to be non-signi¯cant too.
Table 14 shows regression results for the pre and post agreement period
when the only regional industrial growth is introduced, for the remaining
two variables in fact there are no su±cient pre-agreement observations. The
signi¯cance of the cross e®ect of labor intensity and labor force abundance
is con¯rmed in the second period while the regional industrial growth is not
signi¯cantly related to localization of production in both periods.
To sum up there is some evidence of increased localization of production in
the Andean Community after the 90s, it seems moreover that productions
tends to localize in countries with a higher specialization with respect to
partners in the region. The e®ect though is only slightly signi¯cant after
the 90s. For CACM, the relation between the regional industrial growth and
localization of production is not robust, the regional RCA and the ratio r
are never signi¯cant
183.4 Patterns of Inequality
This section is devoted to a brief analysis of patterns in convergence=divergence
in real GDP per capita. From the previous sections no clear evidence of di-
verging production patterns after the agreement emerges: after 1991 indus-
trial location does not seem to be prevented to spread across countries within
the same agreement. Now, aggregate data on per capita GDP is going to be
used for an overall analysis of inequality in Latin American agreements . A
diverging pattern in per capita income might be driven not only by localiza-
tion of production but by localization of services as well.
Within the branch of the empirical growth literature focusing on the relation
between openness and convergence in income levels, a pioneer work was the
one by Ben-David (1993) who speci¯cally focused on the experience of the
European Community. With a non parametrical approach, Ben-David ana-
lyzes the pattern of the standard deviation of the log of income per capita
levels in the region, comparing this to the timing of the evolution of the EEC.
From the comparison before=after of the dispersion in income levels for the
European Countries, he concludes that the dispersion has decreased after
the EEC was formed and this pattern is not only a long term trend. But,
more recently Slaughter (1998) examines the same issue using the di®erence-
in-di®erences approach, thus reading in the experience of 10.000 randomly
chosen control groups what the pattern of convergence in the European Coun-
tries would have been in the absence of the agreement. Apart from the EEC,
he focuses on the formation of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the
agreement between EFTA and EEC, and the Kennedy Round tari® cuts
19under the GATT. His conclusions are that \trade liberalizations does not
trigger convergence in any of the four cases, if anything it seems to have
caused income divergence. In all the four cases, the large majority of the
10.000 di®erence-in-di®erences estimates are not signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero and the average among the signi¯cant estimates indicates that trade
liberalization tends to diverge incomes."(Slaughter (1998))
3.5 The empirical model II
Following Slaughter (1998), the empirical strategy is based on the reconstruc-
tion of a natural experiment setting via the use of the di®erence-in-di®erences
approach(Blundell et al. (2000)(2002)). The formal model is the following
¾jt = ®0 + ®1Dt + °0Dt ¤ Gi + ¯0t + ¯1t ¤ Dt + ¯2t ¤ Dt ¤ Gi + ui + ²it (4)
¾jt measures the per capita income dispersion within each group of coun-
tries (Andean group, Central American Common Market, Mercosur Group,
Control Group). This is calculated as the standard deviation of the log of
the real income per capita of the countries in the agreement. On the right
hand side we have the time dummy Dt, taking value 1 from the date of the
agreement onwards, and its interaction with the group dummy, Gi = 1 for
the agreement group , and Gi = 0 for the control group. The other compo-
nents of the right hand side are a time trend, t, its interaction with the time
dummy Dt, and its interaction with the agreement indicator Dt ¤ Gi. This
last term is introduced in order to investigate whether the three South-South
20Table 6: Groups and Regimes
COUNTRY GROUP=REGIME Model (1) INTERCEPT RATE OF CONVERGENCE
Treatment group before the agreement ®0 ¯0
Treatment group after the agreement ®0 + ®1 + °0 ¯0 + ¯1 + ¯2
Control group before the agreement ®0 ¯0
Control group after the agreement ®0+®1 ¯0 + ¯1
Regional Trade agreements have contributed to convergence or divergence in
income levels among the countries involved. The parameter of interest here
is ¯2, when it is negative then the rate of dispersion has decreased during
the period under observation. Table 6 shows the di®erent intercepts and
convergence rates for the agreement and the comparison groups.
The interaction of the time trend with the treatment indicator will re-
veal whether the agreement has contributed to increase or decrease the rate
of convergence, whereas the coe±cient on the interaction between the time
dummy and the trend will reveal what the pattern of the rate of conver-
gence would have been in the same period, in the absence of the agreement.
The unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous selection are caught in the
country speci¯c time invariant e®ect ui that is wiped out through the use of
Within Group estimator. For the choice of the control group, the dispersion
for 204 random groups of countries that did not undergo any of the three
agreements was calculated and estimations were repeated 204 times in order
to check robustness of results.
3.6 Basic Results.
Figures 2-4 show the pattern of income dispersion among the countries in the
three agreements. On the y axis the standard deviation from the regional
mean of the log of the real GDP per per capita is measured. For Mercosur,
21¯gure 2 shows a sharp decrease of dispersion until the end of the 80s, but after
1991 there is a clear and strong tendency to the increase of the deviation of
member countries income per capita levels from the mean. For the Andean
Community dispersion in per capita GDP tends to decrease after 1969, is
quite stable during the eighties and after a positive peak in the beginning of
the nineties goes down again. Finally, for CACM the pattern of the standard
deviation is quite stable until the ¯rst half of the seventies, then it decreases
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Table 7-9 show results from the estimation of 4 for three di®erent measures
of real GDP per capita 13. The average14 from the signi¯cant estimates of
the additional rate of convergence is shown in the second column, while
the ¯nal column shows the number of trials where the additional rate of
convergence is not signi¯cant. Negotiation of CACM and Mercosur seem to
have fostered divergence while the re-negotiation of the Andean Pact seems
to have enhanced convergence. Though, from the third column the number of
trials with non signi¯cant coe±cients is much wider than the number of trials
with signi¯cant estimates and this is valid for each di®erent measure of GDP
per capita adopted. Then no ¯nal evidence on enhanced inequality in income
levels by means of South-South trade agreements exists, thus con¯rming
results from the previous sections.
13In tables 7 and 8 respectively the Laspeyres and the current price real GDP per capita
are used. In table 9 instead the real GDP per worker is used.
14The model estimation was repeated 204 times with 204 di®erent random control groups
of the same size of the agreement groups.
23Table 7: Results I: dependent variable real GDP per capita I





Table 8: Results II: dependent variable real GDP per capita II






This paper addresses the issue of South-South integration, trade specializa-
tion, location of production and inequality in Latin America. The empirical
evidence on trade and production data shows that the degree of introversion
increased in Latin American sub-regions after the negotiation of trade agree-
ments in the 90s. Countries re-directed some exports, mainly from traditional
industries in South America and from more dynamic ones in Central America,
towards the sub-regions and, according to data on production, localization
increased in a number of sectors especially in the Central American Common
Market and the Andean Community. In the 90s some countries became more
specialized than before. Some of these were already highly specialized be-
Table 9: Results III: dependent variable real GDP per worker





24fore the 90s,(e.g. Colombia, El Salvador, Costa Rica) but some others gained
ground after the negotiation of the agreement(e.g. Ecuador and Guatemala).
Two di®erent empirical models were estimated.
On one hand a data set made up of disaggregated data on trade and produc-
tion was used in order to check whether industrial localization was a®ected
by increasing economic integration and trade specialization patterns. Three
di®erent variables were used to check for the role of regional integration: the
regional industrial output growth, the RCA with respect to the region and
the inverse of the ratio between this and the whole region RCA with respect
to the rest of the world. Only for the Andean Community there is some
evidence of localization of production increasing with the enlargement of the
market, moreover countries with intermediate comparative advantages seem
to do better then the rest of the region, the e®ect, though, is not strongly
signi¯cant after the 90s.
On the other hand, an empirical model based on aggregated data was esti-
mated to detect by means of a di®-in-di®s technique whether the negotiation
of the agreements enhanced divergence in income per capita among part-
ners. The evidence which emerges by the use of 204 di®erent random control
groups suggests that for the majority of the estimations the e®ect of the
agreements on the rate of convergence is not signi¯cantly di®erent from 0
and from the average of signi¯cant estimates Mercosur and CACM seem to
have fostered divergence while CAN seems to have triggered convergence.
Thus putting all the evidence together, the evidence on South-South RTAs
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27Table 10: Results CAN I
N.Obs. 2546 1345 1345
Groups 108 107 107
Coef. P > jzj Coef. P > jzj Coef. P > jzj
sikt¡1 0.84 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.57 0.00
agr.gdp -0.28 0.00 -0.11 0.29 -0.13 0.20
edu. 1.38 0.01 1.13 0.28 1.01 0.33
mkt pot. -0.50 0.00 -0.68 0.05 -0.60 0.08
lab.force -4.17 0.01 -15.50 0.00 -15.61 0.00
link. 0.05 0.43 0.23 0.09 0.21 0.13
lab.int. -1.77 0.00 -5.63 0.00 -5.82 0.00
skill int. 0.21 0.15 0.08 0.78 0.05 0.85
lab.force*lab.int. 0.46 0.00 1.48 0.00 1.53 0.00
edu*skill int. -0.11 0.02 -0.06 0.52 -0.05 0.60
sc.econ.*mkt pot. 0.19 0.01 0.14 0.33 0.12 0.39
reg. ind.gr. 0.44 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.33 0.00
reg. RCA 0.02 0.03
r -0.02 0.00
Table 11: Results CAN II
N.Obs. 1687 859
Groups 108 108
Coef. P > jzj Coef. P > jzj
<1991 >1990
sikt¡1 0.81 0.00 0.38 0.00
agr.gdp -0.35 0.00 0.41 0.07
edu. 1.26 0.15 8.89 0.00
mkt pot. -0.45 0.06 -1.59 0.01
lab.force -0.90 0.80 -31.25 0.00
link. -0.01 0.87 0.51 0.02
lab.int. -0.18 0.88 -3.06 0.26
skill int. 0.13 0.61 1.39 0.00
lab.force*lab.int. 0.04 0.88 0.87 0.20
edu*skill int. -0.09 0.28 -0.46 0.00
sc.econ.*mkt pot. 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.76
reg. ind.gr. 0.20 0.01 0.49 0.00
28Table 12: Results CAN III
N.Obs. 845 845
Groups 107 107
Coef. P > jzj Coef. P > jzj
>1990 >1990
sikt¡1 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.00
agr.gdp 0.43 0.07 0.41 0.07
edu. 7.28 0.00 7.29 0.00
mkt pot. -1.46 0.01 -1.39 0.01
lab.force -33.16 0.00 -33.54 0.00
link. 0.45 0.03 0.44 0.04
lab.int. -4.11 0.18 -4.17 0.17
skill int. 1.03 0.00 1.02 0.00
lab.force*lab.int. 1.14 0.13 1.16 0.12
edu*skill int. -0.34 0.00 -0.34 0.00
sc.econ.*mkt pot. -0.02 0.97 -0.03 1.00
reg.sect. gr. 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.00
reg. RCA 0.04 0.18
r -0.03 0.07
Table 13: Results CACM I
N.Obs. 757 299 299
Groups 110 102 102
Coef. P > jzj Coef. P > jzj Coef. P > jzj
sikt¡1 0.69 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.79 0.01
agr.gdp -0.53 0.01 2.50 0.64 2.47 0.64
edu. 1.87 0.00 -6.96 0.91 -6.44 0.92
mkt pot. -0.40 0.48 4.89 0.79 4.90 0.79
lab.force -12.35 0.00 -72.00 0.39 -71.36 0.40
link. -0.49 0.01 1.31 0.37 1.30 0.37
lab.int. -3.40 0.01 -10.29 0.00 -10.21 0.00
skill int. 0.07 0.46 -1.19 0.04 -1.18 0.05
lab.force*lab.int. 0.84 0.01 2.46 0.00 2.45 0.00
edu*skill int. -0.09 0.00 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.20
sc.econ.*mkt pot. -0.10 0.46 -1.28 0.31 -1.19 0.34
reg. ind.gr. 0.34 0.00 0.27 0.37 0.26 0.38
reg. RCA 0.03 0.66
r -0.04 0.48
29Table 14: Results CACM II
N.Obs. 458 299
Groups 105 102
Coef. P > jzj Coef. P > jzj
<1991 >1990
sikt¡1 0.56 0.00 0.83 0.00
agr.gdp 0.03 0.98 2.45 0.65
edu. 1.84 0.11 -6.23 0.91
mkt pot. 0.12 0.93 4.92 0.80
lab.force -11.59 0.43 -71.79 0.39
link. -0.28 0.42 1.35 0.36
lab.int. -7.79 0.18 -10.24 0.00
skill int. 0.21 0.09 -1.21 0.04
lab.force*lab.int. 1.96 0.18 2.44 0.00
edu*skill int. -0.14 0.00 0.28 0.21
sc.econ.*mkt pot. 0.14 0.60 -1.37 0.27
reg. ind.gr. 0.32 0.01 0.30 0.34
30